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by the Marburger Bund (a craft union), while the remaining workers are represented by the German Trade Union (Verdi). Such a situtation is called "tari¤ plurality" ("Tarifpluralität"). In contrast to "tari¤ competition,"tari¤ plurality is characterized by unions representing workers which provide complementary services. Typically one workforce (as hospital doctors) is represented by a fully specialized craft union (Haucap, 2012) . 5 In Germany, craft unionism and multi-union bargaining are on the rise in other industries as well (Bachmann and Schmidt, 2012) . The Deutsche Bahn (the dominant railway operator) must bargain with the German Train Drivers Union (Gewerkschaft Deutscher 4 The merger consisted of the following unions: Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft (German Employees Union), Deutsche Postgewerkschaft (German Postal Service Union), Gewerkschaft Handel, Banken und Versicherungen (Retailing, Banking and Insurance Union), Industriegewerkschaft Medien, Druck und Papier (Media, Printing, and Paper Union), Industriegewerkschaft Publizistik und Kunst (Publishing and Art Union), and Gewerkschaft Ö¤ entliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr (Public Utilities, Transport, and Tra¢ c Union). 5 In general, collective bargaining in Germany was dominated by industry unions which are organized in the German association of unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund ; DGB). The newly established craft unions are not members of the German association of unions, so that …rms must determine employment condition with two unions in those instances (the craft union and the traditional industry union of the DGB).
Lokomotivführer; GDL) and the Railway and Transport Union (Eisenbahn-und Verkehrsgewerkschaft; EVG). 6 Again, the GDL is a fully specialized craft union which is complementary to workers represented by the other union EVG. The former one takes care of the train drivers'employment conditions and the latter one represents the remaining railway workers'interests. Other examples include airlines (where pilots are represented by
Vereinigung Cockpit) and airports (where air tra¢ c controllers are organized in the Gewerkschaft der Flugsicherung). As a consequence, employers …nd themselves exposed to the demands of more than one union while each union represents complementary types of employees.
Behind this background, we explore the consequences of multi-union bargaining, where a single employer bargains with two unions, each one representing either substitutable or complementary workers. 7 We suppose an e¢ cient contracting setting where the union and 6 The EVG was founded on 30 November 2010 as a merger of the unions Transnet and GDBA (see Haucap, Pauly, and Wey, 2007) . It is memeber of the German association of unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund ; DGB). 7 We also examine "tari¤ competition"(when workforces are substitutable) as a theoretical possibility even though Germany's and other countries'labor institutions are protective against this constellation.
However, after the liberalization of the law on employment agencies (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz ) in In contrast, when the unions are complementary, "tari¤ plurality"(or, craft unionism) leads to underemployment (i.e., the joint surplus maximizing employment level would be larger). The …rst union does not internalize the negative externality of reducing its employment level on the second union. At the same time, the second union bene…ts from a worsened disagreement payo¤ of the …rm which allows it to settle on a larger employment level than the …rst union. As bilateral bargaining is e¢ cient (i.e., about both wage and employment), it follows that there is a …rst-mover (second-mover) advantage when the workforces are substitutable (complementary). This follows from applying the (symmetric) Nash bargaining solution which requires to split the net surplus equally. A larger employment level of a union then mirrors a larger contribution to the (bilateral)
surplus, so that a union's wage bill must be larger the larger its employment level. Cai (2000) analyzes a model where a buyer bargains sequentially with two perfectly complementary sellers where the order of reaching an agreements is endogenously determined. 12 He shows the existence of a delay equilibrium which is driven by the fact that the "last"seller obtains a larger share of the joint surplus.
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The Model
We consider a …rm (the employer) which has to reach agreements with two unions X and Y to produce two goods (or services). Production of good 1 requires only labor input 11 The idea of rent-shifting in sequential contracting goes back to Aghion and Bolton (1987) Depending on the …rm's (exogenous Nash) bargaining power, it may prefer to bargain sequentially or simultaneously, or it may prefer to integrate with the supplier before bargaining with the union. 13 In our sequential bargaining setting we assume a …xed order of negotiations. If the unions are complementary, the last union obtains a higher wage bill than the …rst union. According to Cai (2000) this ordering may lead to delays (strikes) which could be avoided by a union merger.
7 from union X with constant returns to labor input, i.e.; q 1 = x, where q 1 is the output of good (service) 1 and x is the employment level of the workforce represented by union X. Similarly, production of good 2 requires only labor input from union Y with constant returns to labor input, i.e., q 2 = y, where q 2 is the output of good (service) 2 and y is the employment level of the workforce represented by union Y . The inverse demand for good i is assumed to be linear and given by p i (q i ; q j ) = 1 q i q j , with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j, where p i is the price of good i and the parameter describes product di¤erentiation with 
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We assume an e¢ cient bargaining setting, so that the …rm bargains with each union over both the wage and the employment level. 16 When unions operate independently, then 14 The upper bound = 1 follows from noting that the two goods are homogenous at this value.
The lower bound ensures that the …rm's pro…t function is strictly positive in the (unique) interior equilibrium. A qualitatively similar restriction on the complementarity of the unions' work forces is also invoked in Horn and Wolinsky (1988a). Otherwise, if complementarity becomes too strong, each union would get more than one-half of the joint surplus under separate bargaining which would lead to a negative pro…t level of the …rm. 15 We can also express the relationship between both workforces by the change of the marginal product of labor with respect to the labor input of the other workforce. Formally, we then get
for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j, which is positive (negative) if < 0 ( > 0). 16 The labor economics literature distinguishes between the right-to-manage model (bargaining only about wage) and the e¢ cient bargaining model (bargaining about both wage and employment level).
8 bargaining proceeds bilaterally and simultaneously. The …rm negotiates with union X (union Y ) over the employment level x (y) and the wage rate w (r). When negotiations are successful, then the …rm produces quantities q 1 and q 2 and realizes pro…ts (x; w; y; r) = P 2 i=1 p i (q i ; q j )q i xw yr. 17 Unions X and union Y maximize their wage bills given by xw and yr, respectively. We use the well-known Nash bargaining solution to solve for optimal contracts. We analyze …rstly the bargaining problems in Section 2.1 (simultaneous and joint bargaining) and Section 2.2 (sequential bargaining). Secondly, in Section 3 we analyze unions' incentives to merge in an initial stage "0", with the bargaining game (either joint or sequential bargaining) following thereafter.
Simultaneous and Joint Bargaining Benchmarks
We start with the analysis of simultaneous and joint bargaining between the …rm and the unions to provide benchmarks which allow us to highlight the e¤ects of sequential endogenous determination of the scope of union-…rm bargaining. 17 In the following, we will write the …rm's pro…t directly as a function of the employment levels as we assumed q 1 = x and q 2 = y.
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Nash bargaining problem between the …rm and union X can then be written as As the unions are symmetric, in equilibrium the optimal number of employed workers and their wages are the same for both unions. The following contract solves the simultaneous bargaining problems (1) and (2) (the superscript "sim" stands for simultaneous bargaining)
The equilibrium employment levels are e¢ cient; i.e., x sim = y sim maximize the joint surplus which is given by := +wx+ry = P 2 i=1 p i (q i ; q j )q i . Substituting the equilibrium values we get sim = 1= [2(1 + )]. The …rm's equilibrium pro…t is given by sim = 1 + 2 4(1 + ) 2 .
To understand how the relationship between both unions'workforces (as measured by the parameter ) a¤ects the surplus sharing, it is instructive to calculate the share the …rm 18 Each bargaining pair takes the wage-employment contract of the other bargaining pair as given when maximizing their Nash product. By that we solve for a Nash equilibrium of two simultaneous bargaining problems (see Chipty and Snyder, 1999 , for a formalization). Inderst and Wey (2003) assume contracts which condition on the fact whether or not the other bargaining is successful. They show that this protocol gives rise to the Shapley value (see also Stole and Zwiebel, 1996) . Our results are easily shown to be qualitatively robust in this regard.
gets from the joint surplus. We obtain Formally, consider that unions X and Y join in a single encompassing union to negotiate with the …rm. We consider the Nash bargaining problem between the …rm and the encompassing union over wages and emplyoment levels of worker groups X and Y . In the case of agreement over the contract (w; x; r; y), the …rm's pro…t is given by (x; w; y; r) = P 2 i=1 p i q i xw yr, while the encompassing union receives wx + ry. In case of disagreement, the …rm must shut down and gets zero pro…t. The union does not have an outside option, i.e., its disagreement payo¤ is zero. The Nash bargaining problem, therefore, can be written as max w;x;r;y
The optimal levels of employment which solve this problem are (the superscript "joi"
indicates equilibrium values under joint bargaining)
which are the same as under simultaneous bargaining. Obviously, under e¢ cient bargaining the employment levels must maximize the parties'joint surplus. The production quantities are then given by q joi 1 = x joi and q joi 2 = y joi for good 1 and good 2, respectively.
The union's wage bill which solves the Nash bargaining problem (3) is given by
Accordingly, the …rm's total pro…t under contract (w joi ; x joi ; r joi ; y joi ) is joi = 1 4(1 + ) .
It follows that the encompassing union and the …rm share the bargaining surplus equally for all possible values of ; i.e., joi = joi = 1=2, where
The following proposition summarizes our results which mirrors …ndings obtained in Horn and Wolinsky (1988a).
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Proposition 1. Suppose union-…rm bargaining determines both the employment level and the wage rate. Simultaneous bargaining as well as joint bargaining then lead to e¢ cient employment levels. Under joint bargaining the entire surplus is shared equally between workers and the …rm, while under simultaneous bargaining the …rm's share of overall surplus is monotonically increasing in ; i.e., increases when the two workforces become more substitutable or less complementary. Workers are jointly better o¤ under joint bargaining when the two workforces are substitutable, while they do better under separate bargaining when they are complementary.
We now turn to sequential bargaining which reveals how bargaining externalities lead to ine¢ ciencies depending on the nature of the two workforces. Those ine¢ ciencies will have a pronounced e¤ects on the overall employment level under separate bargaining and on the unions'incentives to integrate in the …rst place.
Sequential Bargaining
The …rm bargains bilaterally and sequentially with the two unions. In the …rst stage, the …rm negotiates a contract with union X over both the employment level, x, and the wage rate, w. In the second stage, the bargaining outcome of the …rst stage becomes public and the …rm negotiates a contract with union Y which speci…es employment level, y, and a wage rate, r. With that, the …rm also determines its production quantities q 1 and q 2 and realizes its pro…t (x; w; y; r) = P 2 i=1 p i q i xw yr if bargaining is successful. The unions receive their wage bills at the end of the game. The total wage bill for union X is wx, and for union Y it is yr. For each bargaining problem we use the Nash bargaining solution. 21 We solve the game by backward induction.
points. It then also follows that two unions with di¤erent disagreement point may be unable to agree to merge their operations even if they organize substitutable workers. Such a constellation can be observed in Germany for the case of temporary workers where some kind of tari¤ competition exists where unions have been unable to merge so far. 21 Our approach to sequential bargaining (in particular, the application of the Nash bargaining solution and the speci…cation of the …rm's disagreement points) builds on Marx and Sha¤er (1991) where supplierretailer bargaining over two-part tari¤s is analyzed.
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Suppose bargaining was successful in the …rst stage which resulted in a contract (w; x).
Then, in the second stage, the …rm and union Y take the contract (w; x) as given when bargaining over the wage r and the employment level y. If the …rm reaches an agreement with union Y over a contract (r; y), then it gets the pro…t (x; w; y; r). In this case, union Y realizes the wage bill ry. In the case of disagreement, the …rm can only produce good 
Unless the unions'workforces are independent, the optimal contract between the …rm and the union Y depends on the quantity of workers employed from union X. If labor unions produce substitutable goods, i.e., > 0, then both the employment level and the wage rate decrease in the employment level x. The opposite is true for complementary unions.
In the …rst stage, the …rm and union X take the optimal strategies (6) as given when they bargain over employment x and the wage w. If the …rm reaches an agreement with union X over the contract (w; x), then its expected pro…t is (x; w; b y(x); b r(x)). In this case, union X obtains the wage bill wx. In the case of disagreement with union X, the …rm can only produce good 2 and realizes an expected pro…t of DX := (0; 0; b y(0); b r(0)) which gives DX = 1=8 as b y(0) = 1=2 and b r(0) = 1=4 follow from (6). Hence, DX = 1=8
is the …rm's (…xed) disagreement point when bargaining with union X. Union X realizes a wage bill of zero when bargaining is not successful.
The Nash bargaining problem between the …rm and union X can be stated as
where the last equality follows from substituting (6) into (7). The contract (w ; x ) which solves the Nash bargaining problem (7) is given by (asterisks indicate equilibrium values)
Substituting (8) into (6) we obtain the equilibrium contract for union Y which is given by r = 1 2(2 2 ) and y = 1 2 2 .
The equilibrium quantities of the goods 1 and 2 are then q 1 = x and q 2 = y , respectively.
The …rm's equilibrium pro…t then becomes
while union X's wage bill is
and union Y 's wage bill is
The …rm's share of total surplus which follows from = , with := + w x + r y = ii) x > y ( x < y ) if > 0 ( < 0), with equality holding for = 0.
iii) w x > r y ( w x < r y ) if > 0 ( < 0), with equality holding for = 0.
Sequential bargaining creates externalities between the two union-…rm bargaining pairs which a¤ect the unions' wage bills di¤erently. The sign of the externality of the …rst contract (x; w) on the second contract (y; r) can be seen immediately from the optimal bargaining outcome with union Y (namely, (6)). Of course, the externality is negative (positive) if both workforces are substitutable (complementary). Now note that each bargaining pair maximizes the joint surplus over the …rm's disagreement point. As bargaining is about both the wage rate and the employment level, this outcome is always bilaterally ef…cient if successful; i.e., the net surplus is maximized and split equally. Note next that the …rm's disagreement point when bargaining with the …rst union X is …xed at DX = 1=8 which follows from the optimal contract (6) which the will …rm agree upon with union Y in case of a settlement. To the contrary, the …rm's (equilibrium) disagreement point when bargaining with the second union Y is given by DY := (x ; w ; 0; 0) = (1 x )x x w . Because of the symmetry of the bargaining problems, it follows immediately that union Y obtains a smaller wage bill than union X. This wage bill reduction is caused by a negative externality the …rst union X exerts on the second union Y . It also implies a …rst-mover advantage for unions when workforces are substitutable.
In the case of complementary unions ("craft unionism"), the opposite is true; i.e., the …rm's disagreement point is better when bargaining with the …rst union X (i.e., DX > DY for < 0). The …rst union X creates a positive externality on the second union Y , if it reaches an agreement with the …rm. This implies that union X's wage bill must be smaller than union Y 's wage bill which mirrors the second-mover advantage under craft unionism.
3 Joint versus Separate Bargaining
We examine the incentives of the unions X and Y to form a single union before bargaining starts. If unions merge, then the bargaining outcome is given by (w joi ; x joi ; r joi ; y joi ). If the unions do not merge, then bargaining is assumed to be sequential with union X bargaining …rst with the …rm followed by union Y (the solutions given by (8) and (9)).
Before solving the entire game, it is instructive to perform some comparisons between the joint bargaining outcome and the sequential bargaining equilibrium.
Sequential bargaining has the following impact on employment levels when compared with joint bargaining.
Lemma 2. Consider sequential multi-union bargaining (union X …rst and union Y second). Comparison of the employment levels of both unions under joint bargaining and sequential bargaining gives rise to the following orderings:
, with equality holding for = 0.
ii) y < y joi for all 6 = 0, with equality holding for = 0. ii) If < 0, then wages and employment levels are given by (w ; x ; r ; y ).
The proof of Proposition 2 follows directly from comparing the wage bill under joint bargaining (4) with the sum of the wage bills under sequential bargaining (10) and (11).
If the goods are substitutes ( > 0), the total wage bill is larger under joint bargaining than the sum of both unions' wage bills under sequential bargaining. The opposite is true if both workforces are complementary ( < 0) in which case unions prefer to bargain independently.
When workforces are substitutable, then there is no con ‡ict of interest between the unions even if they split the surplus equally under joint bargaining; i.e.,
It follows that both unions agree to merge when being substitutable, so that the e¢ cient outcome is achieved. Bargaining independently would lead to negative externalities (in particular, overemployment) with an overall lower wage bill.
In contrast, if workers are complementary, then the unions do not …nd it jointly attractive to integrate both workforces into a single union even though joint bargaining would increase the entire surplus available for the workers and the …rm. However, interests are not as cleanly aligned as in the case of substitutes. To see this, suppose that both work-forces share the wage bill equally under joint bargaining. It is then true that union X would bene…t from integraton while union Y would be worse o¤; i.e.,
Union X (which bargains …rst) prefers one-half of the total wage bill realized under joint bargaining. In contrast, union Y 's wage bill is higher under sequential bargaining when compared with one-half of the overall wage bill under joint bargaining. Both unions, therefore, must disagree about the question whether or not to integrate their workers into a single union. 24 In total, unions realize a higher wage bill under sequential bargaining when compared with the wage bill realized under joint bargaining. It follows that the possibility of a union merger does not eliminate the underemployment ine¢ ciency associated with craft unionism.
Until now we have focused on the joint surplus of the bargaining parties as our measure of e¢ ciency (i.e., the sum of the …rm's pro…t and both unions'wage bills). If we consider also consumer surplus to take a total welfare perspective, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. Consider the entire game where the unions can …rst decide to merge and then either bargain jointly with the …rm or independently and sequentially. It is then always true that the unions'merger decision is in con ‡ict with total welfare maximization;
i.e., the unions' decision to merge when workers are substitutable reduces total welfare which is also true for the unions'decision to stay separated when workers are complementary. 24 In fact, the incumbent monopoly unions (organized in the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund ; DGB)
heavily lobby against craft unionism so as to re-integrate "renegade" workers. In contrast, of course, craft unions as the Marburger Bund or the Gewerkschaft Deutscher Lokomotivführer (GDL) have been …ghting for recognition in the last years. In our model, union X (which is disadvantaged as a …rst-mover)
would have an incentive to lobby for integration while union Y (which bene…ts from the second-mover advantage) would oppose such demands. In that sense, newly formed craft unions may bene…t from a second-mover advantage which allows them to obtain a large wage bill at the cost of the wage bill of the incumbent union's workers.
20
The proof of Corollary 1 follows from observing that total welfare is given by the sum of consumer surplus and the sum of the …rm's pro…t plus workers'wage bills. Of course, this welfare measure is monotonically increasing in the employment levels of both workforces in the relevant range. As the unions'decisions to merge under substitutable workforces and not to merge under complementary workforces both reduce the employment levels both decisions must also reduce social welfare. We conclude that Corollary 1, therefore, mirrors the often mentioned assessment that (powerful) unionism in general (and not only craft unionism) is a challenge to a society's well-being (see, e.g., Simon, 1944) .
Conclusion
We have analyzed multi-union bargaining which is an issue in countries with a fragmented labor movement. In countries like France, Italy, or Belgium, and also more recently, in
Germany trade union pluralism is a fact which has not been much analyzed in the existing literature on union-…rm bargaining. Even if unions can merge freely their businesses such an outcome is not likely in the presence of craft unionism. When unions'workforces are complementary (tari¤ plurality), then they can achieve a higher surplus when bargaining separately. As union-…rm bargaining is characterized by an observable (and not renegotiable) tari¤ agreement, multi-union bargaining is adequately modelled as a sequential procedure. 25 Sequential bargaining leads to overemployment under substitutable unions which then have strong incentives to form a single union. In contrast, under craft unionism the sequential bargaining outcome is characterized by underemployment. As unions prefer to stay independent when workers are complementary, the underemployment ine¢ ciency can be expected to persist.
The relevance of our model is underlined by the recent bargaining between the Deutsche Bahn (the dominant railway operator in Germany) and the German Train Drivers Union (Gewerkschaft Deutscher Lokomotivführer; GDL) and the Railway and Transport Union (Eisenbahn-und Verkehrsgewerkschaft; EVG). While the latter union (which is part of the DGB) reached an agreement with the Deutsche Bahn in 2013 over employment security issues, the craft union GDL delayed negotiations until today to obtain a better contract for the train drivers by ripping o¤ its second-mover advantage.
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Unions'merger incentives are exactly opposite to the social welfare maximizing union structure. If the represented workforces are substitutable, then "tari¤ competition"would be socially desirable, but unions'incentive to monopolize the labor market prevail. If, to the contrary, the workforces of the unions are complementary, then "tari¤ plurality" is socially inferior to joint bargaining, but unions'rent-shifting incentive back union plurality.
Many labor laws are extremely defensive against a fragmented union structure at the …rm level. In Germany, for instance, tari¤ competition at the …rm-level is directly fought by several instruments as the tari¤-unity principle and entry-deterring strategies which assign the privilege of collective bargaining exclusively to a single union and (last but not least) extension rules which make the dominant tari¤ contract generally binding for all workers of a particular type in a certain industry. While those measures have been quite successful in the past, they mainly help to monopolize the labor supply and to protect it against competition.
Interestingly, tari¤ pluralism (or, craft unionism) is on the rise as labor institutions are less restrictive in this regard. Recently legal practice in Germany has been reassuring that tari¤ pluralism cannot be eliminated by the tari¤-unity principle, so that …rms must come to terms with powerful craft unions. A fragmented union structure is likely to persist as craft unions have strong incentives to stay independent. From a social point of view that trend is likely to induce underemployment which harms social welfare.
Our analysis can be extended in several directions. First, asymmetries between unions may change bargaining outcomes and union merger incentives. It would be interesting to analyze both the di¤erent sources for union asymmetries and their consequences on equilibrium outcomes. Second, labor institutions may treat unions di¤erently (for instance, depending on their "representativeness"of a …rm's employees) which may force unions to merge even when they are complementary.
